

REFLECTIONS ON THE TURNABOUT IN LABOR RELATIONS POLICY IN OCCUPIED JAPAN

ENDO Koshi*

Among those Japanese who were active in the labor movement during the occupation days and Japanese researchers of today who are studying the history of the labor movement, it is considered an indisputable fact that the General Headquarters/Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) drastically changed its labor relations policy in occupied Japan. In contrast, recent studies on the occupation policy by Japanese researchers, drawing primarily upon recently disclosed official U.S. documents, without denying its existence outright, do not so definitively affirm that such a policy turnabout did take place. Given these two contrasting views, my purpose in this paper is twofold. On the one hand, I would like to scrutinize critically the views held by Japanese labor movement historians concerning the turnabout in the labor relations policy in occupied Japan as well as those held by Japanese researchers of the occupation policy. On the other hand, I will argue, on the basis of my own recent analysis of disclosed official Japanese documents, that labor relations policy in Japan was indeed turned around, and will also present my own interpretation of the significance of this policy switch. I hope this paper, written with these aims, will also serve as an effective critique of the argument advanced by some Americans who were on the GHQ staff and American researchers studying the Japanese occupation that emphasizes the consistency of occupation policy and asserts that the so-called "reverse course" did not exist.

Three Different Views Held by Labor Movement Historians Regarding the Policy Turnabout

Labor movement historians unanimously agree that labor relations policy was radically reoriented by GHQ/SCAP. They are, however, at variance among themselves as to what event marked the beginning of this policy turnabout. In my view, these scholars can be grouped into three schools.

One school of labor movement historians asserts that the policy turnabout began on January 31, 1947, when SCAP called off the general strike scheduled for the following day, February 1. The second school considers the shift in policy to have begun with the issuance of a SCAP statement on May 20, 1946 severely denouncing the mass demonstrations of the preceding day,

the "Food May Day." The third school is of the opinion that SCAP's letter of July 22, 1948 to Prime Minister Ashida, in which the former insisted upon depriving public employees of their vested right to strike and bargain collectively, marked the beginning of the policy turnabout. Needless to say, the policy switch was not completed as a result of any single event, but through a series of events that took place over a certain span of time. But depending on which particular event one chooses to demarcate the beginning of the policy turnabout, one arrives at differing interpretations of the significance of the policy turnabout itself. In other words, examining the significance of the event asserted to be the turning point by each of the three schools is tantamount to assessing the significance each attaches to the policy turnabout.

Let me begin with the first view that identifies the SCAP statement calling off the February 1, 1947 General Strike as the turning point. This view is supported by a predominant majority of the historians of the labor movement who believe that labor relations policy was turned around. For instance, in his paper examining the periodization of the postwar labor movement history in Japan, Shiota Shobei surveyed the works of 13 researchers and found that 11 of them identify February 1947 as the turning point.¹ This view has so many subscribers because this is exactly how the majority of Japanese workers at the time felt about the General Strike and its ban. Today's labor movement historians have regarded, just as the workers of 1947 did, the abortive February 1, 1947 General Strike as an extremely important event in postwar labor movement history. More than four million workers, or virtually all organized workers at the time, were to have taken part in the General Strike. Organized not only around economic demands but also around political demands including the overthrow of the reactionary cabinet headed by Prime Minister Yoshida, it was considered to be the part and parcel of the ongoing postwar democratization movement. The February 1, 1947 General Strike was the first general strike ever planned in Japan. Workers at the time looked upon the planned General Strike as the culmination -- a culmination reached within the short span of one and a half years after the movement's rebirth in the wake of Japan's defeat in the war -- of the Japanese labor movement and its often-used synonym, the democratization movement, and may labor movement historians have entertained the same view. When SCAP called off the General Strike, the workers were grieved all the more because they had pinned such great expectations on it, and present-day researchers empathize with this grief. The regenerated labor movement in Japan had been aided considerably by GHQ/SCAP's policy to encourage the labor movement, a

policy that was an important component of its democratization policy. Given this -- reasoned the workers of the time, as do present-day researchers -- SCAP's ban on the General Strike, an event planned by a labor movement that was supposedly being supported by GHQ/SCAP, could only have meant that GHQ/SCAP had discarded its policy of encouraging the labor movement and had adopted instead a policy of suppressing it.

It should be pointed out that underlying this reasoning is a presumption, widely shared among the workers of the day, that SCAP would not, or could not, ban the General Strike. That is to say, it was assumed that the General Strike fell, or else would be forcibly interpreted to fall, within the limits of the labor movement encouragement policy SCAP had been following as part of its democratization program. It is because of this presumption that workers responded to the news of the calling-off of their General Strike with such great shock and took the banning as a sign of a drastic shift in GHQ/SCAP's labor policy. Why such a presumption prevailed may be explained in part in terms of the historical and cultural circumstances in which the Japanese working class found itself at the time. Another, more important, factor I would like to stress is the image which the leadership of the labor movement, or the organizers of the February 1, 1947 General Strike, had formed of the Occupation Forces and the conjectures they made based on it. The General Strike was formally planned and organized by the Zen-Nihon Sangyobetsu Rodo Kumiai Kaigi (Sanbetsu; Congress of Japanese Industrial Unions), but its actual organizing body was the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) which exerted a strong influence over Sanbetsu. As is well known, the JCP at the time viewed the Occupation Forces as a "liberation force" which would liberate Japan from fascism and militarism. This characterization of the Occupation Forces led logically to the conclusion that MacArthur, who was the supreme commander of the "liberation force," was literally a representative of the Allied forces that led the fight against fascism. It also led to the reasoning that the policies administered by SCAP would naturally be held in check by the various Allied Powers, including the Soviet Union. Stretching this reasoning, the JCP leadership conjectured that even if SCAP tried to ban the February 1 General Strike, the part and parcel of the democratization movement, he would naturally be prevented from doing so by the Allied Powers. Thus, the JCP concluded, SCAP would not, or could not, call off the General Strike.

This presumption, however, proved to be wrong, because it was based on a fatally erroneous characterization of the Occupation Forces as a "liberation force." To be sure, MacArthur was the Supreme Commander for the Allied

Powers; but at the same time he was also Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC). GHQ was staffed exclusively by Americans, and the Occupation Forces, too, consisted almost exclusively of U.S. armed forces personnel. Insofar as the occupation of Japan was carried out in the name of the Allied Powers, the Occupation Forces were a "liberation force" at least in a formal sense. In actuality, however, Japan was occupied exclusively by U.S. imperialism, and U.S. imperialism had no intention of adopting a policy that would run counter to its own interests. At present, the JCP itself admits that its conception of the Occupation Forces as a "liberation force" was a mistaken one.² And John W. Dower, drawing upon abundant documents and materials, has clarified the significance of this exclusive U.S. imperialist occupation of Japan.³ However, workers at the time did not share this perspective. They went along with the JCP's presumption that SCAP would not, or could not, ban the General Strike. When MacArthur -- who thought the General Strike would undermine U.S. imperialism's hold on occupied Japan -- banned the strike, they were deeply shocked and thought that GHQ/SCAP had changed its policy.

That the workers took the ban as a policy switch initiated by GHQ/SCAP is in itself an important fact in the history of the postwar labor movement. However, the perception that a policy switch had occurred and an actual switch in policy are two different things. The ban on the General Strike by no means represented a shift away from the pre-existing occupation policy of U.S. imperialism of attempting to rule Japan stably. The workers' perception that occupation policy had undergone a major change resulted largely from their own unfounded presumption. Indeed, once the massive General Strike was called off the day before its scheduled date, they, surprisingly enough, did not even dare to stage small-scale wildcat strikes. The workers who had presumed that the General Strike would be sanctioned by the GHQ/SCAP now concluded that one disapproved by it would not be feasible.

Let me turn to the second view, i.e., the one that sees in May 1946 warning against mass demonstrations the beginning of the policy turnabout. This view, recently advanced by Yamamoto Kiyoshi from a new perspective,⁴ has produced a significant influence on some researchers in Japan and the United States, including Sato Koichi and Joe Moore.⁵ The distinctive feature of Yamamoto's view is his assertion that the attainment of a socialist revolution was the primary task facing the Japanese working class in the immediate aftermath of Japan's defeat. From this standpoint, Yamamoto attaches special importance to two movements: the production control by workers, and their taking to the streets en masse in response to the food crisis. Yamamoto

reasons that the former represented factory takeovers in embryonic form and the latter a state of public anarchy, both of which paralyzed the capitalist order. And, according to Yamamoto's understanding, the workers participating in these movements, although not conscious of it, were struggling to achieve a socialist revolution. These movements gathered momentum in the first half of 1946, thriving and culminating in the "Food May Day" of May 19 the same year. After SCAP's warning against mass violence, backed by the military might of the Occupation Forces, was issued, these movements began to decline. In Yamamoto's view, the workers' movement that had earlier aimed for a socialist revolution, now transformed itself into one that was concerned primarily with the achievement of higher wages within the capitalist order, and it was SCAP's warning against mass violence that caused this transformation. Yamamoto considers this the turnabout in the occupation policy. Clearly, Yamamoto's view, based on the assertion that the Japanese working class in the immediate aftermath of the war was confronted with the task of building a socialist revolution, is critical of the first view mentioned above, which regards the democratization of Japan as the immediate task that confronted the working class. And this difference leads to a difference in the timing of the policy turnabout.

I have two questions regarding Yamamoto's understanding of the policy turnabout. The first question is: What does he mean by policy turnabout? What he sees as having been turned around, in my view, is not labor relations policy, but the labor movement itself. Even if SCAP's warning against mass violence induced the labor movement to reorient itself, such a reorientation is not the same thing as a shift in GHQ/SCAP's labor relations policy. To make my contention clearer, let me pose my first question differently: What sort of labor relations policy does Yamamoto think GHQ/SCAP followed before the turnabout? Although he does not say so explicitly, the answer that logically derives from his view would be that GHQ/SCAP's labor relations policy in the early days of the occupation prior to the policy turnabout was one tolerant of a socialist revolutionary movement. This answer is utterly unacceptable. To add in passing, Moore, writing under the influence of Yamamoto's view, contends that GHQ/SCAP's policy before the turnabout was that of "benign toleration of almost any effort of workers to organize and resist their employers."⁶ To suppose, however, that the GHQ/SCAP was tolerant enough to allow workers to engage in a revolutionary movement is inconceivable. Even if the labor movement did undergo a turnabout, this does not immediately mean that GHQ/SCAP had reoriented its own labor relations policy. It should be pointed out, however, that Yamamoto seems to be aware of this

to some degree, because when he talks about a turnabout in occupation policy, he often encloses the word "turnabout" in quotation marks.

My first question about Yamamoto's understanding of the policy turnabout boils down to the question of how the period from the beginning of the occupation through the first half of 1946 should be characterized. In my understanding, the period should be regarded as the one in which occupation policy took a concrete and well-defined form. This holds true for labor relations policy, as well. It was during this period that the Trade Union Law (TUL) and the Labor Relations Adjustment Law (LRAL), the two pieces of fundamental legislation in the field of labor relations policy, were enacted. It was also during this period that the dissolution of the Sangyo Hokoku Kai ("Sampo" for short; Patriotic Industrial Association) was decided upon and the interpretation of production control set forth by the administrative branch of the government was found illegal. Also, SCAP's May 1946 warning against mass violence can be regarded as a further clarification of GHQ/SCAP's policy position made toward the end of the period. The warning by no means represented a policy turnabout on the part of GHQ/SCAP since, had it been asked at any point in time during this period if it would tolerate a revolutionary movement, its answer would have been flat denial. MacArthur would never have sanctioned a revolutionary movement that might challenge the interests of U.S. imperialism.

The second question I have about Yamamoto's view concerns the very premise upon which he maintains that the labor movement reoriented itself. I wonder if his contention that the Japanese working class in the immediate aftermath of the war was struggling for a socialist revolution is really tenable. Workers at the time, along with the JCP, identified democratization, not socialist revolution, as their immediate goal. In effect, Yamamoto looks at the Japanese working class of the early postwar era from his own viewpoint, assigning it a task which it did not actually pursue; and an assessment of the labor movement of the time from this perspective leads inevitably to an overestimation of the labor movement that actually unfolded at the time. And, insofar as I find Yamamoto's approach unacceptable, I cannot but conclude that his contention that SCAP's warning against mass violence triggered a reorientation of the labor movement is also an exaggeration of reality.

Let me now turn to the third view, which identifies SCAP's letter of July 22, 1947 to Prime Minister Ashida as the beginning of the policy turnabout. This view, maintained for a long time by a small number of researchers, was recently advocated most vehemently by Hayakawa Seiichiro.⁷ Hayakawa pays

attention to how the right of collective bargaining granted to a large number of public employees, including National Railway workers and postal workers, was modified during the occupation period and concludes that SCAP's letter marked the beginning of the policy turnabout. This is so, according to Hayakawa, because SCAP's letter and its legalized manifestation in the form of Ordinance No. 201 deprived all public employees of their right to strike and bargain collectively and nullified labor agreements in which their vested rights were specified. GHQ/SCAP's policy, which had formerly allowed the greater majority of public employees to enjoy almost full rights of collective bargaining, was now changed into one which denied all such rights to all public employees. Hayakawa's view, with its emphasis on this complete about-face in the legal prescriptions, is quite easy to understand. SCAP's letter chose the railway workers and the postal workers as its target of attack because they formed the most militant echelon of the Japanese working class at the time.

The first view that regards the SCAP statement calling off the February 1, 1947 General Strike as the beginning of the policy turnabout is naturally rejected by Hayakawa. He criticizes this view on two grounds. In the first place, he asserts that, even though the SCAP's ban on the General Strike was an intervention to call off a specific strike, it did not permanently and systematically deny workers their right to strike. In the second place, it was after the banning of the General Strike that full-fledged labor agreements specifying the rights of the railway and postal workers, both in the public sector, were concluded.

I, for one, basically agree with Hayakawa's assertion that the SCAP's letter marked the beginning of the policy turnabout. In subscribing to his view, I would like to emphasize three points. The first point is that prior to the issuance of SCAP's letter, GHQ/SCAP had been following a concrete and well-defined policy, i.e., a policy of granting, through prescriptions of written law, a majority of public employees almost full rights of collective bargaining. This policy had taken concrete shape by mid-1946. Indeed, one distinctive feature of the third view is that, unlike the first and the second views, it is free of ambiguity regarding what sort of policy preceded the policy turnabout. Contrary to what the first view logically implies, GHQ/SCAP, prior to calling off the February 1, 1947 General Strike, had never expressly stated that it would approve of the General Strike. Similarly, the second view, in order to be viable, must presuppose that GHQ/SCAP before issuing its warning against mass violence had approved of a socialist revolutionary movement. In fact, it had never taken such a position, either

openly or tacitly. However, in the case of the third view, which takes SCAP's letter as marking the beginning of the policy turnabout, a well-defined policy had been in place, and the letter represented a shift away from this pre-existing policy. This is clearly a "policy turnabout" made by GHQ/SCAP itself. Since this is an extremely important point, I will return to it again when I present my own view later.

The second point I would like to emphasize is that unlike the ban on the February 1, 1947 General Strike and SCAP's warning against mass violence, SCAP's letter of July 22, 1948 was met with concrete protest action, i.e., a nation-wide spontaneous walkout on the part of the workers. As I have already pointed out, although workers at the time regarded the ban on the February 1, 1947 General Strike as a policy turnabout, they did not even dare to stage a small-scale wildcat strike in response. SCAP's warning against mass violence did not arouse any protest action either. Only SCAP's letter of July 1948 gave rise to widespread, concrete protest action, and this fact seems to suggest that workers at the time, even though unconsciously, did regard the letter as qualitatively different from the ban on the February 1, 1947 General Strike; that is to say, as a real shift in occupation policy.

The third point I would like to emphasize is that SCAP's letter ushered in a real shift in labor relations policy not only for public employees but for workers in the private sector as well. Prior to the issuance of the SCAP's letter of July 22, 1948, voices had been raised within GHQ's staff calling for revision of the TUL of 1945 on grounds that this law, drafted by the Japanese Labor Legislation Council, did not adopt the concept of a bargaining unit, and as such, and in many other respects, too, was in conflict with American style labor relations policy typified by the Wagner Act,⁸ but the GHQ Labor Division had kept the lid on these demands. However, five days after SCAP's letter was issued, drafting of a revised TUL got underway. There is no denying that SCAP's letter opened the way for the drafting work that resulted in the Revised TUL of 1949. It is, however, erroneous to interpret this revision simply as an introduction of American-style labor relations policy to Japan. To illustrate this, it suffices to recall that during the drafting of the Revised TUL, GHQ/SCAP gave up the idea of incorporating the concept of a bargaining unit into the revised law, and that a provision stipulating that a labor agreement could be extended only with the consent of the two parties concerned was added to the revised law. This provision was meant to scrap, with a stroke of pen, the advantage that workers had under earlier labor agreements. The earlier labor agree-

ments in Japan frequently contained a clause stipulating that pending the conclusion of negotiations for a new agreement, the existing agreement would automatically remain in force. Such stipulations were now prohibited outright. As such, the provision, in my view, was devised afresh, quite independent of the American style labor relations policy, and was meant to serve as a weapon of assault on militant labor unions.⁹ At any rate, SCAP's letter brought about a radical change in labor relations policy pertaining to all Japanese workers, both in the public and the private sectors.

Views Entertained by Researchers of Occupation Policy

Ever since official U.S. documents of the occupation period began to be disclosed, there has been remarkable progress in the empirical study of occupation policy. Among the researchers of this school, Takemae Eiji and Igarashi Takeshi, in works based primarily upon these disclosed documents, have expressed their views about the shift in GHQ/SCAP's labor relations policy.

Drawing mainly on official U.S. documents, Takemae, a pioneer among Japanese researchers studying labor relations policy of the occupation period, has recently written a book dealing comprehensively with GHQ/SCAP's labor policy that exemplifies the level of achievement reached by researchers of the subject in Japan.¹⁰ I would like to take up this book, and examine his views concerning the switch in occupation policy.

Takemae states in the "Introduction" to his book: "Looked at from the standpoint of the occupied people, it is undeniable that a 'turnabout' was clearly sensed." He thus admits that occupation policy underwent a turnabout. However, he chooses not to specify when this turnabout took place, stating, also in the "Introduction," that "since it is difficult to identify a turning point, I have assigned a fairly broad time-span to the turnabout." In the body of the text, Chapter IV entitled "The Turnabout in Occupation Policy and Subsequent Labor Policy" is devoted to a consideration of when the turnabout took place. The chapter consists of four sections: "1. The Prohibition of the February 1, 1947 General Strike," "2. The Establishment of the Labor Ministry," "3. The Revision of the National Public Service Law (NPSL)," and "4. The 1949 Labor Law Revisions."

The structure of the chapter, in which the ban on the February 1, 1947 General Strike is dealt with first, might give the impression that Takemae, even though choosing not to specify when the turnabout began to take place, attaches considerable weight to the first, or the majority view, mentioned

earlier. On the contrary, however, his actual presentation emphatically maintains that the ban on the General Strike did by no means mark the beginning of a policy turnabout. More precisely, he stresses that 1) the principle upon which SCAP based its ban on the General Strike -- "Strike should be prohibited when the occupation authorities consider that they would prejudice the objectives of the occupation -- had been consistently upheld since the original drafting of the occupation policy in Washington, 2) GHQ/SCAP had communicated to union leaders repeatedly since February 1946 its unified view that it would prohibit strikes which might threaten to stop transportation and communications; and 3) during the month of January 1947, immediately before the planned General Strike, SCAP's intention not to approve it on grounds that it would paralyze transportation and communications had been communicated to union leaders repeatedly. Contrary to the impression one receives from the structure of Chapter IV, Takemae, it appears to me, is not subscribing to the view that regards the ban on the February 1 General Strike as the beginning of the turnabout in occupation policy. As for the warning against mass violence, which marked the beginning of the policy turnabout according to the second view, Takemae makes only a brief mention of it in the preceding chapter, and thus it is obvious that he does not share the second view.

SCAP's letter, which the third view regards as having ushered in the policy turnabout, is not dealt with by Takemae as an important topic on its own, but merely as an episode in the course of his discussion in a section entitled "The Revision of the National Public Service Law (NPSL)." It is clear from his handling of SCAP's letter that Takemae does not agree with the third view. Summing up his view about the fact that the letter deprived all public employees of their right to strike and bargain collectively, Takemae states as follows.

"The thesis that regards [the restriction of the public employees' fundamental rights as workers through the SCAP letter] as a measure purposefully taken on the basis of a change or turnabout (NSC13/2) in American occupation policy toward Japan consequent to the unfolding of the cold war, and which was thus meant to serve as a 'ground breaking' first step toward making Japan an anticommunist breakwater by restructuring and reinforcing Japanese monopoly capitalism and thereby preparing for the start of the Korean War, cannot be supported on the basis of an empirical analysis of facts. It is more appropriate to regard the restriction of workers' fundamental rights as a by-product, or an unexpected offspring, produced in the process of implementing the reform of bureaucracy, one of the main pillars

of occupation policy."¹¹

In other words, in Takemae's view, SCAP's letter does not represent a change in occupation policy, but is, on the contrary, a manifestation of the consistency of that policy.

It thus seems that while Takemae admits in the "Introduction" to his book that there was a turnabout in occupation policy, in the main discourse of the book he argues in favor of the occupation policy's consistency. In particular, SCAP's letter, which in my view marked the turning point of occupation policy, is according to Takemae simply evidence showing that the reform of the bureaucracy, one of the important objectives of occupation policy, was consistent.

Igarashi, a specialist in American political and diplomatic history, has written several papers dealing with the turnabout in American occupation policy toward Japan,¹² including one that analyzes the turnabout in the occupation authorities' labor policy by taking up the enactment and revision of the National Public Service Law (NPSL).¹³ I would like to examine his view of the turnabout in occupation policy expressed in this last paper.

In this paper, Igarashi stresses that there were two sides to the democratization policy in the early occupation days. On one side, the democratization policy was characterized as an institutional reform, or an introduction of the democratic system to Japan. It was characterized on the other as a policy for "promoting a democratization movement" and "looking after the internal Japanese democratization movement."¹⁴ Igarashi assesses the ban on the February 1, 1947 General Strike and SCAP's letter in relation to these two aspects. The reason why the General Strike was prohibited, according to him, is that "the labor movement, that was supposed to have been under the patronage of GHQ/SCAP, had gained momentum far more rapidly than had been anticipated or expected, and moreover had begun to act on its own in pursuit of the realization of self-determined goals." Elaborating his point further, Igarashi remarks as follows: "GHQ/SCAP opposed the February 1, 1947 General Strike also out of concern for the institutional framework of democracy that was to be established, and there emerged a disharmony between the two aspects, the aspect of an institutional reform and that of a democratization movement, that had characterized the democratization policy in the early occupation period." Igarashi's assessment of the ban on the February 1, 1947 General Strike, in my interpretation, boils down to two points: 1) that as far as the institutional reform aspect of early occupation policy is concerned, the ban on the General Strike did by no means represent a shift in policy, but instead was revealing of its consistency;

and 2) that as far as the democratization movement aspect of this policy is concerned, the ban did represent a policy turnabout.

The SCAP's letter, according to Igarashi, was "a forcible implementation of American-style institutional reform" wherein GHQ took "seriously the fact that the labor movement could become a threat to GHQ goals." The incident itself "brought to the surface in manifest form the friction between the institutional reform and the democratization movement that was being increasingly recognized since the February 1 General Strike, giving a tremendous shock to the labor movement." My own understanding is that Igarashi is of the opinion that, on the one hand, SCAP's letter, too, did not represent any turnabout in the institutional reform aspect of early occupation policy, but instead revealed its consistency, and on the other, represented a further escalation of the ongoing change in occupation policy in its democratization movement aspect.

Although Igarashi does not use the term "turnabout in occupation policy," it is fairly clear that he sees the democratization movement aspect of occupation policy as having taken a turnabout and the beginning of the turnabout as marked by the ban on the February 1, 1947 General Strike. This is also evident in his point that following the ban on the General Strike, GHQ/SCAP changed its policy to that of "competitive coexistence" with the JCP over the support of union members; that is to say, it adopted a policy of nurturing anticommunist members within the labor unions. Thus, Igarashi is in agreement with the first view mentioned earlier as far as his choice of the event marking the turning point is concerned. It should be noted, however, that Igarashi points out that in March 1948 "MacArthur responded negatively to the idea of changing occupation policy to make it better suited to the international cold war." Immediately after this remark, Igarashi adds that by July of the same year, when SCAP's letter was issued, MacArthur's reaction had changed and goes on to present his assessment of the letter to which I have referred to above. In this context, Igarashi also seems to regard SCAP's letter as marking the beginning of a policy turnabout. Regardless of which turning point he really means to take, there is no denying that Igarashi sees the democratization movement aspect of occupation policy as having undergone a turnabout. In this sense, he admits that there was a shift in the occupation policy.

It is important to note, however, that Igarashi argues that occupation policy in its institutional reform aspect remained unchanged. This is apparent with respect to both the ban on the February 1, 1947 General Strike, which he regards as the beginning of the policy turnabout, and SCAP's

letter, which I regard as the beginning of the policy turnabout. Igarashi's recognition of a policy turnabout is thus conditioned by the assertion that policy in its institutional reform aspect remained consistent.

A Turnabout from What?

I have already pointed out that, of the three views advanced by researchers of labor movement history, I support the third view which takes SCAP's letter of July 1948 as the beginning of the switch in occupation policy. However, researchers studying U.S. occupation policy, drawing mainly upon official U.S. documents, assert that SCAP's letter reveals the consistent nature of occupation policy in its institutional reform aspect. I find these researchers mistaken and contend that occupation in its institutional reform aspect, too, was turned around with the issuance of the SCAP's letter.

These researchers are mistaken because they leave a number of important questions including the following unanswered: What, in their view, was the policy that prevailed before the issuing of SCAP's letter?; How and by whom was this policy formulated?; What were the major features of that policy? These researchers judge the characteristic of SCAP's letter only within the narrow context of the reform of the national public service system. To be sure, SCAP's letter did emerge out of the process of amending the NPSL that was being undertaken by GHQ/SCAP. Nonetheless, it was neither the pre-revision NPSL nor the Japanese bureaucracy inherited from the prewar days that had provided the foundation of the policy -- that is, the policy of allowing the majority of public employees to exercise their right to strike and bargain collectively -- implemented prior to the issuance of SCAP's letter. Rather, the policy had as its base Article 38 of the 1946 Labor Relations Adjustment Law (LRAL), which reads as follows: "Police officers, firemen, those employed at prisons and officials and employees engaged in the work of the national, prefectural and municipal government administration or judiciary, exclusive of public enterprises, shall be disallowed to resort to acts of dispute."

This Article specifies the categories of public employees who should not be allowed to resort to acts of dispute. It is obvious that this provision shows that all public employees not specified therein -- who, under the public service system of Japan at the time, included National Railway workers, postal workers, and public school teachers, and in fact constituted the overwhelming majority of the public employees -- were free to exercise their

right to strike and bargain collectively. There is nothing unusual about a provision concerning public employees' right to strike and bargain collectively being incorporated in the LRAL rather than the NPSL, since, theoretically speaking, the question of granting these rights to public employees is not merely a matter concerning the nature of the public service system, but also related directly to the question of who, among the various categories of workers, would be allowed to exercise these rights and to what extent.

The character of policy based on the LRAL has been mistakenly interpreted by many researchers of labor problems in Japan to be a policy for labor movement repression. Their mistaken notion of the LRAL derives, in part, from their paying too much attention to the fact that Article 38 of this law prohibits a portion of public employees from engaging in dispute actions, while ignoring the fact that many of the other provisions of the law prescribe procedures for reconciling labor disputes.¹⁵ The misunderstanding is due, on the one hand, to the peculiar nature of the theory of labor law prevalent in Japan. It is also due to the fact that the process by which the LRAL was established is not widely known. On the basis of official documents and memorandums collected by a Japanese bureaucrat who was in charge of the work related to the law's passage, I recently corrected this misunderstanding about LRAL-based policy and presented my own understanding of the issue.¹⁶ I would like to point out below some of my most important findings and show how the conventional understanding of policy based on the LRAL is mistaken.

The single most important fact regarding the drafting and establishment of the LRAL is that the draft law prepared jointly by a group of Japanese bureaucrats and the Japanese Labor Legislation Council was rejected by the GHQ Labor Division, and in its stead a draft prepared by five GHQ staff members led by Theodore Cohen, Chief of the Labor Division, was handed to the Japanese government and eventually promulgated as the LRAL. This replacement of the Japanese draft by GHQ/SCAP's version was of critical significance with respect to the provision concerning public employee right. The original text of the provision in the Japanese draft proposed that a government ministry in charge of labor administration be allowed to issue orders prohibiting dispute actions by various types of public employees, including railway workers, postal workers and school teachers. Investing not a third party such as a judge, but a government ministry (the very opponent which public employees confront in times of dispute), with the authority to issue an order prohibiting public employee dispute actions, was tantamount to a flatout ban on such dispute actions.

The repressive nature of this provision in the Japanese draft becomes

even clearer when it is compared with prewar Japanese labor relations legislation. It is true that in prewar Japan the police practically prohibited workers from engaging in dispute actions; but contrary to what many people would suppose today, there was in fact only one legal provision that specifically empowered government offices in prewar Japan to prohibit dispute actions, i.e., Article 7 of the National Mobilization Law of 1938, the fundamental law sustaining the wartime fascist regime. The provision concerning public employees' right of the draft LRAL was taken from this article of the National Mobilization Law, with application narrowed to include only public employees.

This provision was replaced with an alternative provision in the draft drawn up by the GHQ, and became Article 38 of the established LRAL. The latter provision, in my view, was meant to oppose the de facto permanent prohibition of dispute actions of all public employees proposed by the Japanese draft, and instead explicitly recognize the rights of a majority of public employees, including those of railway workers, postal workers and school teachers, to strike and bargain collectively.

This was attested to by two episodes that took place between the presentation of GHQ/SCAP's draft law to the Japanese authorities and the enactment of that draft into the LRAL. The first episode took place at a Cabinet meeting to finalize the LRAL Bill for submission to the Diet when the bill was suddenly amended to prohibit school teachers from resorting to dispute actions. When informed of this amendment, Cohen, GHQ Labor Division Chief, made the government withdraw it, asserting that no school teacher in any state of the United States was prohibited from engaging in dispute actions.

The second episode took place the day after the enactment of the LRAL, when the Japanese government drafted an emergency Imperial Ordinance that would have enabled the government to issue orders prohibiting dispute actions on the part of various categories of workers. The draft Imperial Ordinance, which defied the newly established LRAL, had no chance of gaining the approval of GHQ/SCAP. Marquat, Cohen's superior, Chief of the Economic and Scientific Section, flatly rejected it. And Cohen himself recounts that the proposed draft ordinance was "insulting" and that paying a visit to GHQ to report on it was an act of "nerve" that seemed to him "almost on the order of defiance."¹⁷

The foregoing observations clearly answer the question left untouched by the researchers of occupation policy, i.e., the question of what sort of policy had been at work prior to the issuance of SCAP's letter. The policy that had recognized the rights of a majority of public employees to strike

and bargain collectively had as its base Article 38 of the LRAL. This article was drawn up by GHQ staff members for the purpose of rejecting the provision of the draft prepared by the Japanese which proposed the prohibition of dispute actions by all public employees on a practically permanent basis. As such, Article 38 of the LRAL did not represent a "mistaken" policy formulated by the Japanese government, but instead a policy stating expressly the intention of GHQ/SCAP. There were but a handful instances where GHQ staff drew up draft laws and handed these over to the Japanese authorities. The LRAL is one of the few laws that were prepared in this manner, the best-known of these cases being the Constitution of Japan.

If the policy that had been followed prior to the issuing of SCAP's letter was the work of GHQ/SCAP, then SCAP's letter represented a change in GHQ/SCAP's pre-existing policy. If this cannot be considered a "policy turn-about," what can? What is more, both the LRAL and SCAP's letter had to do with institutional arrangements, and thus it is clear that the policy turn-about involved the institutional reform aspect of occupation policy.

There are several factors that explain why researchers studying occupation policy look at SCAP's letter only in the context of the institutional reform of the public service system and fail to pay sufficient attention to Article 38 of the LRAL. I would like to point out two such factors. One concerns the availability of pertinent materials. Many of the official U.S. documents on the reform of the public service system are accessible at the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) and elsewhere. And official Japanese documents on the subject, unlike in many other areas, have been compiled in a four-volume work.¹⁸ However, to the best of my knowledge, the whereabouts of official U.S. documents on the LRAL are unknown.¹⁹ And the existence of official Japanese documents on the LRAL, too, was virtually unknown until I made use of them. Given these circumstances, it is only too natural for researchers studying occupation policy by way of an empirical approach to have been far less interested in the reform of the public service system.

Another factor of importance concerns the theoretical climate in which studies of occupation policy have been undertaken. Many of the labor movement historians and scholars of labor law in Japan have characterized the LRAL of 1946 as legislation meant specifically for the suppression of the labor movement, while placing the TUL of 1945, a law pertaining to the workers' right of association, in high esteem as legislation that encouraged labor unions and their activities. On the basis of this assumption, they have paid a large amount of attention to the TUL as a manifestation of early

pre-turnabout occupation policy, regardless of the way in which they interpret the policy turnabout itself. In the fact of this influential theoretical perspective, it would not have been easy for researchers of occupation policy to show any sustained interest in the LRAL.

It was only by overcoming these two constraints, one pertaining to the availability of materials and the other pertaining to the prevailing theoretical perspective, that I have been able to give the LRAL the attention it deserves.

Two Comments on the Ongoing Debate over the "Reverse Course"

It must be clear by now that GHQ/SCAP's labor relations policy underwent a major shift, changing from one based on Article 38 of the LRAL to that prescribed in SCAP's letter. On the basis of the foregoing discussion, I would like to make two comments on the debate now being conducted in the United States over the "reverse course."

My first comment is addressed to those who maintain that occupation policy remained consistent throughout the occupation period. A book authored by Justin Williams, who was on the GHQ staff, has one of its chapters, "Continuity of United States Policy," devoted specifically to asserting emphatically that occupation policy remained unchanged throughout its course.²⁰ Taking up areas such as purge and economic recovery that are usually regarded as areas in which a policy turnabout took place, he denies in each and every instance that this was the case. In the area of labor, he addresses himself to the reform of the public service system. He asserts that the completion of the reform of the public service system following the issuance of the SCAP's letter is a good example of how consistent occupation policy was. The reason why the U.S. government approved of SCAP's letter and the revision of the NPSL despite the decision of NSC13/2 is explained in the following way: "Washington, then, gave higher priority to the principles of the Wagner Labor Relations Act of 1935, which denied public employees the right to strike and bargain collectively, than to the recent NSC dictum that SCAP stop sponsoring reform legislation."²¹

I have already pointed out that by looking at SCAP's letter only in the narrow context of the reform of the public service system, one would commit the error of overlooking the existence of a policy founded upon LRAL. What I would like to address myself to here is the question of whether SCAP's letter and the revision of the NPSL could be justified by the "principles" of the Wagner Act, as Williams claims. I do not find William's interpreta-

tion accurate. It is true that the Wagner Act was not applied to railway workers and public employees including school teachers and postal workers, but this does not mean they were denied dispute actions. Railway workers in the United States were not public employees, and as evident in the Railway Labor Act of 1926, they were not prohibited from taking recourse in dispute actions. And in the case of school teachers who were on the payrolls of state or lower-level administrative bodies -- although I can only speculate due to my lack of knowledge of as to how Common Law was applied or what the provisions of state laws were like in the early postwar era -- it seems that their dispute actions were not uniformly denied in every state. In this connection, I would like to focus once again on Cohen's above assertion that no school teacher in any U.S. state was prohibited from engaging in dispute actions, the assertion that he made when talking the Japanese government into withdrawing its amendment to the LRAL Bill meant to deny such actions by school teachers. It is also true that U.S. postal workers were public employees, but telecommunications workers were not and the latter were not prohibited from resorting to dispute actions. In short, even under the "principles" of the Wagner Act, railway workers and telecommunications workers, at the very least, were clearly not denied dispute actions, and it seems highly plausible that school teachers were not either, at least in some states. Under the Japanese public service system at the time, however, railway workers, school teachers and telecommunications workers were all public employees. Given the difference between the public service systems of the United States and Japan, William's assertion that the "principles" of Wagner Act "denied public employees the right to strike and bargain collectively" is inaccurate, and cannot justify the deprivation of railway workers, school teachers and telecommunications workers in Japan of their right to strike and bargain collectively.

Needless to say, when Cohen and his team drafted Article 38 of the LRAL in 1946, they did so with intimate knowledge of American-style labor relations policy as articulated in the Wagner Act and other labor legislation. And they undertook, I imagine, the drafting work with such American-style labor relations policy in mind. To be sure, they chose not to deny railway workers, school teachers and telecommunications workers the right to engage in dispute actions. But this does not mean that they neglected American-style labor relations policy. This meant instead that in making their decision, they took heed of the difference between the public service systems of Japan and the United States, and differentiated various categories of public employees in accordance with their job content, rather than judge them by

their status as public employees. One reason why they were rigorous in specifying the categories of public employees to be denied dispute actions very narrowly, as is evident in their allowing postal workers to resort to dispute actions, may be that they had been influenced by the British-style labor relations policy which tacitly approved dispute actions on the part of all public employees. (But to assume that they intended to introduce the British policy wholesale is erroneous, because under such an assumption one cannot explain why they denied, by means of Article 38 of the LRAL, some public employees, albeit a very small fraction of them, their right to engage in dispute actions. They, too, had American-style labor relations policy in mind.)

In contrast, SCAP's letter of 1948 judged public employees by their status not by their job content, and deprived railway workers, school teachers and telecommunications workers of their right to strike and bargain collectively. MacArthur stressed in the SCAP letter that this policy was perfectly in accord with the American-style labor relations policy, as do many of those who are of the opinion that occupation policy remained consistent from beginning to end. But was the policy set forth by SCAP's letter really in accord with American-style labor relations policy? Judging from substance rather than appearance, it is possible to conclude that it was Article 38 of the LRAL, and not SCAP's letter, that was the genuine representation of American-style labor relations policy. This is precisely why, as both Takemae and Igarashi have described vividly, there was theoretical room left for Killen, Chief of the GHQ Labor Division, and Hoover, Chief of the Civil Service Division, to argue in the presence of MacArthur over the advisability of carrying out the policy set forth in SCAP's letter, and why MacArthur found it difficult to pass judgement on the matter. To say that SCAP's letter and the revision of the NPSL were in accord with the American-style labor relations policy and therefore justifiable is, in my understanding, very arbitrary, wishful thinking.

Such arbitrary thinking seems to be shared by many of the subscribers to the view that occupation policy as a whole -- not simply in the area of labor relations -- remained coherent from beginning to end. Peter Frost, who participated a debate over the "reverse course" at the 1980 Amherst International Conference, is a case in point. Although he made no mention of labor relations policy, he stressed that occupation policy in various areas retained an "American perspective" from beginning to end.²² But his effort to prove the continuity of occupation policy with his emphasis on the very vague concept, "American perspective" or "American way of seeing things,"

proves nothing specific. What he must do instead is clarify this concept, and then prove the continuity of occupation policy without making use of this concept arbitrarily. But such a venture, in my opinion, has no chance of success.

My second comment on the "reverse course" debate concerns the inappropriateness of the very term "reverse course." In the United States, the term "reverse course," originally imported from Japan, is used to refer to the turnabout in occupation policy. In this paper, however, I have chosen not to use this term in that sense, because I find such use unacceptable on two counts.

In the first place, the term "turnabout in occupation policy" and the term "reverse course" bring to mind in Japan two distinct periods. The term "reverse course" was in vogue in Japan from late 1951 to 1952, as a metaphor for the social atmosphere generated by events such as the lifting of the purge and the remilitarization of Japan. By contrast, the turnabout in occupation policy, regardless of how it is understood, is considered to have preceded these socio-political developments.

Secondly, and more importantly, the term "reverse course" has carried in Japan ever since it was in vogue the nuance of "going back to the socio-political order of prewar Japan." A majority of the Japanese responded negatively to the lifting of the purge and the remilitarization of their country, sensing that these could take them back once again to militarist and aggressive prewar Japan, and ultimately to the misery of war. An allusion to these new socio-political developments with a line from a popular Japanese song -- that went "This road, I remember we've followed it before" -- gave rise to the widely adopted term "reverse course." I for one, a Japanese longing for peace, find this war-abhorring popular feeling to be of tremendous importance. It is precisely this feeling that is preventing the present-day Japanese government from pursuing a policy for nuclear armament and is applying the brakes on its arms build-up policy.

In contrast, the turnabout in occupation policy does not imply going back toward the socio-political order of prewar Japan. This is especially evident in the case of labor combinations policy. Under the labor combinations policy of prewar Japan, even though workers' right to association was not formally denied by laws, workers, whether in the private or public sector, had only a very limited margin of free union activity because of police suppression. And on the eve of the Pacific War in 1940, all the labor unions that had been barely surviving under all sorts of restrictions were forcibly disbanded by an administrative directive. The socio-political order

of Japan before its defeat in the war did not even tolerate, let alone encourage, free union activities. However, under the postwar socio-political order, the policy permitting and encouraging free union activities was denied neither before nor after the turnabout in the occupation policy. To be sure, the turnabout in occupation policy in the area of labor relations dealt a severe blow to leftist and militant unions of public employees, and a not insignificant blow to workers in the private sector. It should be remembered, however, that the policy turnabout itself was never meant to deny Japanese workers their right to form unions.

The term "reverse course," used in the sense of of the turnabout in occupation policy, carries the nuance that the policy turnabout was meant to revive the prewar Japanese socio-political order. The use, actually misuse, of the term in the above sense seems to help make the contention of those who emphasize the occupation policy's consistency sound somewhat plausible, because insofar as the socio-political order which GHQ/SCAP intended to build in postwar Japan was radically different from that of the prewar days, its policy certainly remained unchanged before and after the policy turnabout. The term "reverse course" is one thing, and the term "turnabout in occupation policy" another, because the former implies going back to the prewar socio-political order, while the latter connotes a radical switch in GHQ/SCAP's attitude as to what sort of socio-political order it would like to establish in postwar Japan.

Notes

* Here and throughout this article, East Asian names are given in the East Asian order, i.e., with family names first. The author, formerly Research Associate at the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, from April 1981 to March 1984, is now Associate Professor of social policy at the Faculty of Literature and Social Sciences, Yamagata University.

1. Shiota Shobei, "Sengo Rodoundoshi no Jikikubun ni tsuite" (On the periodization of postwar labor movement history), *Shakaiseisaku Gakkai Nempo*, Dai 15-shu: *Sengo Rodoundo no Tenkaikatei* (The annals of the Society for the Study of Social Policy, Vol. 15: The development process of postwar labor movement), Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1968.
2. Central Committee, Japanese Communist Party, *Fifty Years of the Japanese Communist Party*, revised and enlarged edition, Tokyo, 1980, pp. 114-15.
3. John W. Dower, "Occupied Japan and the American Lake, 1945-50" in Edward

Friedman and Mark Selden, eds., *America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1971.

4. Yamamoto Kiyoshi, *Sengo Kiki ni okeru Rodoundo* (The labor movement in the postwar crisis), Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobo, 1977, Chapters 1 and 3; *idem.*, *Yomiuri Sogi, 1945-46* (Yomiuri Strikes, 1945-46), Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1978. I owe the former book for the suggestion to differentiate the three views regarding the beginning of the policy turnabout asserted by researchers of the labor movement history. For an outline of Yamamoto's view in English, see *idem.*, "'Mass Demonstration' Movements in the Period of Postwar Crisis," *Annals of the Institute of Social Science*, No. 17, 1976, pp. 51-88.
5. Sato Koichi, ed., *Sengo Nihon rodoundoshi* (The labor movement history in postwar Japan), 2 vols., Tokyo: Shakai Hyoronsha, 1977; and Joe Moore, *Japanese Workers and the Struggle for Power: 1945-1947*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.
6. Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 189.
7. Hayakawa Seiichiro, "Makkaasaa-Shokan, Seirei 201-go no Konnichiteki Saikento Shiron" (MacArthur's letter on the NPSL and Ordinance 201, re-examined from the present-day perspective), *Rodoundoshi Kenkyukai* (Labor Movement History Research Association), ed., *Rodoundoshi Kenkyu* (Labor History Review), combined issues Nos. 55 and 56, *Senryoka Rodoundo no Bunseki* (Analyses of the labor movement in occupied Japan), Tokyo: Rodojumposha, 1973; *idem.*, "Kankoroshikankei no Seisei to Tenkai: Kokutetsu, Yusei ni okeru Kenrikankei o chushinto shite" (Emergence and development of labor-management relations in government and public agencies: The cases of the National Railway and postal workers' struggles for rights), *Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo*, ed., *Sengo Kaikaku*, 5: *Rodo Kaikaku* (Postwar reforms, 5: Labor reform), Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974.
8. Endo Koshi, "1945-nen Rodokumiaiho no Keisei" (I), (II) (Formation of the Trade Union Act of 1945, Parts I and II), *Nihon Rodokyokai Zasshi* (Monthly Journal of the Japan Institute of Labour), Nos. 242 and 243, May and June 1979.
9. On the revision of the TUL, see my forthcoming paper.
10. Takemae Eiji, *Sengo Rodo Kaikaku: GHQ-Rodoseisakushi* (Postwar labor reform in Japan: History of GHQ labor policy), Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1982.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 210.
12. Igarashi Takeshi, "Tainichi Kowa no Teisho to Tainichi Senryoseisaku no

- Tenkan" (MacArthur's proposal for an early peace with Japan and the re-direction of occupation policy toward Japan), *Shiso*, No. 628, October 1976; "Tainichi Senryoseisaku no Tenkan to Reisen" (The turnabout in the occupation policy toward Japan and the cold war), and "Jooji F. Kennan to Tainichi Senryoseisaku no Tenkan" (George F. Kennan and the turnabout in the occupation policy toward Japan), both collected in Nakamura Takafusa, ed., *Senryoki Nihon no Keizai to Seiji* (The economy and politics of Japan during the occupation), Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1979.
13. Igarashi Takeshi, "Minshushugikan no Sokoku: Kokkakomuinho no Kaisei to Kokunai-reisen no Kenzaika" (Rivalry overviews on democratization: The revision of the National Public Service Law and the emergence of the domestic cold war), *Kindai Nihon Kenkyukai* (Modern Japanese Studies Association), ed., *Nempo: Kindai Nihon Kenkyu*, 4: *Taiheiyo Senso* (Annual Journal of Modern Japanese Studies, 4: The Pacific War), Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1982.
 14. *Ibid.*, p. 240. Here, Igarashi's definition of the second aspect of the democratization policy is clear enough. But in the latter part of the same paper, he describes this same aspect as simply a "democratization movement," thereby, it appears to me, blurring the difference between "an internal Japanese democratization movement" and one "encouraged" by GHQ/SCAP. However, in order to do justice to Igarashi's contention, I will follow his terminology. The five quotations that follow are from *ibid.*, pp. 241, 244, 258, 267 and 268.
 15. This mistaken notion of the LRAL is uncritically accepted by some researchers abroad. See, for instance, Jerome B. Cohen, *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949, p. 438 and Jon Halliday, *A Political History of Japanese Capitalism*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1975, p.210.
 16. Endo Koshi, "Rodokankei Choseiho Seitei to Keieikyogikai Shishin Sakusei: 1946-nen no Roshikankei Seisaku" (I), (II) (Japan's labor relations policy in 1946: The Labor Relations Adjustment Law and the Guide to Labor-Management Councils, Parts I and II), Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, *Shakai Kagaku Kenkyu* (Journal of Social Science), Vol. 35, Nos. 4 and 6, December 1983 and March 1984.
 17. The existence of the draft of the emergency Imperial Ordinance had been unknown until recently when official documents of the Japanese Foreign Ministry were disclosed. Following the disclosure of these documents, Takemae held an interview with Cohen, and succeeded in eliciting his opinion on the draft emergency Imperial Ordinance. The fact that the

- decision was suddenly made to put the LRAL into effect earlier than scheduled is used by some as a basis for concluding that the LRAL was a law specially designed for the suppression of the labor movement. However, the fact that the Japanese government drafted the emergency Imperial Ordinance concurrently with the law's enforcement shows that the government found the law inappropriate for use as a means of suppressing the labor movement.
18. Jinjiin (National Personnel Authority), ed., *Kokkakomuinho Enkakushi* (The history of the National Public Service Law), Tokyo: Jinjiin, 1969.
 19. During my visit with the NARS in January 1982, I found that the documents of the GHQ Labor Division housed there (i.e., RG 331, Box 8477-8506) contain virtually nothing pertaining to the LRAL.
 20. Justin Williams, Sr., *Japan's Political Revolution Under MacArthur: A Participant's Account*, Athens: University of Georgia Press; Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1979.
 21. *Ibid.*, p. 218.
 22. Peter Frost, "Nihon Senryo ni okeru 'Gyakukoosu'" (Changing gears: The concept of "Reverse Course" in studies of the occupation of Japan) contained in a collection of papers presented at the Amherst conference, edited by Ray Moore and published in Japanese, *Tenno ga Baiburu o Yonda Hi* (The days when the Emperor read the Bible), Tokyo: Kodansha, 1982. Since these conference papers are published only in Japanese, the term "American perspective" quoted here is my re-translation of the Japanese "Amerika-teki mikata" (*ibid.*, p. 323).